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 THE SYNOPTIC MODEL OF
 STRATEGIC PLANNING
 AND THE GPRA
 Lacking a Good Fit With
 the Political Context
 NANCY ROBERTS
 Naval Postgraduate School
 Strategic planning is now required for federal agencies. The Government Perfor-
 mance Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 (P.L. 103-62), having received overwhelming
 bipartisan support (as well as endorsements from the General Accounting Office
 [GAO], American Society of Public Administration, and National Academy of Public
 Administration [NAPA], among others), required virtually all agencies and govern-
 ment corporations to write and submit strategic plans to Congress by September 30,
 1997. (Only the Central Intelligence Agency, GAO, Panama Canal Commission,
 Postal Service, and Postal Rate Commission are exempted from the provisions of the
 act.)
 In May and June 1997, the GAO and Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
 reported on GPRA implementation in pilot projects that had begun in fiscal year 1994
 and ended in fiscal year 1996. Drawing on lessons learned from these test beds of
 implementation, all federal agencies were to submit their 5-year strategic plans to the
 OMB and Congress by September 30, 1997. At the same time, all agencies were to
 submit their annual performance plans for fiscal 1999 to the OMB. Performance plans
 were to cover every program and financing schedule in the budget appendix for the
 agency and were to be submitted each fiscal year thereafter. In January 1998, the OMB
 submitted the federal government plan (based on agency plans) as part of the fiscal
 1999 budget request. By March 2000, agencies were to have submitted fiscal 1999 per-
 formance reports to the president and Congress documenting how well they met their
 performance plans. These performance reports will recur each fiscal year hereafter.
 Strategic plans are to be updated at least every 3 years and are to cover the major
 agency functions.
 Implementation of the GPRA has faced a number of challenges since enactment.
 These challenges have been well documented in GAO reports and testimony that have
 tracked the progress of pilot programs and agencies (e.g., GAO, 1996, 1997a, 1997b,
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 1997c, 1998a, 1998b). Many of the difficulties have been technical such as teaching
 federal executives to distinguish among process, output, and outcome measures to
 gauge performance (GAO, 1995; Groszyk, 1995). The first order of intervention, in
 fact, has been to introduce managers to the language, logic, and skills of strategic plan-
 ning and management. As expected, the learning process has been "uneven." GAO
 auditors acknowledge that it will take time to orient federal managers to a new way of
 planning and managing and to develop routines that enable them to process informa-
 tion and make informed decisions about what they do and how they do it (GAO,
 1997b). Other observers agree, acknowledging that "we are in the early stage of a diffi-
 cult and long-term work in progress" (NAPA, 1998, p. 3), and patience is required.
 Scanning these reports, one finds some reason for optimism. Since 1994, progress
 has been made, most notably in the latest round of revisions during the time period
 from June 1997 to September 1997 (GAO, 1998a). Noting that agencies' strategic
 planning efforts "are still very much a work in progress" (p. 3), the GAO found that, in
 contrast to June strategic plans, all September 1997 plans contained at least some dis-
 cussion of each element required in the GPRA. In many cases, plans that contained
 earlier weaknesses were substantially improved. For example, the Department of
 Transportation amended its June plan to explain how its mission statement was linked
 to its authorizing legislation. Thus, according to the GAO, the September plans
 appeared to provide a "workable foundation" for continued implementation of the
 GPRA.
 Despite these encouraging signs, however, I believe that there is reason to be con-
 cerned about certain aspects of the GPRA as it is applied to all federal agencies and
 programs. This article explores two related concerns. First, I submit that embedded in
 the GPRA is one model of strategic planning: the synoptic approach. The synoptic
 approach is defined as a conscious, comprehensive, rational planning effort in which
 top executives formulate the organization's goals, oversee their implementation, and
 measure their progress while at the same time making adjustments to the goals as
 changes in environmental and organizational conditions warrant (Roberts, 1993).
 Second, there is an implicit assumption in the GPRA that this synoptic model of
 strategic planning fits all situations and bureaus no matter what their context or situa-
 tion. As I point out in this article, the "one-size-fits-all" model of strategic planning is a
 poor fit for many public bureaus, particularly those in highly politicized contexts, with
 diverse missions, conflicting stakeholder interests, and crossing-cutting programs that
 require collaboration among multiple bureaus and levels of government. In fact, as I
 document, many of the challenges and problems that agencies experience as they
 attempt to implement the GPRA can be directly linked to the strategic planning model
 that is being used. Unless the GPRA expands its limited conceptualization of strategic
 planning beyond the synoptic approach and allows agencies some flexibility in the
 models they employ, many agencies will continue to experience difficulties in imple-
 menting the law.
 To sustain the GPRA and prevent erosion of its basic intent, the article concludes
 with a recommendation that policy makers consider the use of alternative models of
 strategic planning, in particular, the strategic issues approach. Although there is no
 guarantee that this model will succeed where the synoptic model has floundered, the
 strategic issues model does have its advantages. The article ends with a summary of
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 these advantages and a recommendation that the GPRA permit executives greater
 flexibility in the use of strategic planning models.
 Synoptic Approach to Strategic Planning
 DEFINITION
 In basic terms, the synoptic approach to strategic planning is characterized by "inte-
 grated comprehensiveness." Ideally, this approach is a conscious effort launched by
 top management to integrate the decisions that compose the overall strategy to ensure
 that plans are consciously developed, mutually reinforcing, and integrated into a
 whole (Fredrickson, 1983). Sometimes referred to as the goals approach that repre-
 sents a hierarchy of goals from the more general at the corporate level to the more spe-
 cific at the operational level (Bryson, 1995), the synoptic approach is in line with tradi-
 tional planning theory from the private sector. It is a "formalized procedure to produce
 articulated result(s) in the form of an integrated decision" (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 34).
 Three basic premises inform this approach (p. 42). The first premise is that strategy
 formation should be a conscious, controlled, formalized effort, decomposed into spe-
 cific steps and procedures with delineated checklists and supportive techniques. The
 second is that responsibility for the overall strategic planning process rests with the
 chief executive officer (in principle), and its execution rests with the staff planners (in
 practice). The third is that strategies come out of the planning process fully developed
 and articulated so that they can be implemented through objectives, budgets, pro-
 grams, and operating plans.
 SYNOPTIC APPROACH EMBEDDED IN THE GPRA
 The GPRA embeds the synoptic approach to strategic planning. By law, an agen-
 cy's strategic plan is to include a comprehensive mission statement covering major
 functions and operations; general and outcome-based goals and objectives for all
 major functions and operations; a description of how goals and objectives are to be
 achieved including the processes, skills, technology, human capital, information, and
 other resources required; an explanation of how performance goals relate to general
 goals in the strategic plan; key external factors that could significantly affect achieve-
 ment of goals and objectives; and a description of program evaluations to be used in
 reviewing what has been accomplished and a schedule for future evaluations.
 Under the GPRA, executives at the strategic apex (top of the agency) serve as the
 locus of decision making. Cognizant of their legal mandates, they are responsible for
 developing a comprehensive mission statement that covers all of the agency's major
 functions and operations. Armed with a mission statement, they then identify support-
 ing goals for all major functions and operations. Cascading down the hierarchy, goals
 move from the more general at the policy level to the more specific at the operational
 and functional levels. The point is to integrate all organizational activity into a compre-
 hensive whole by having each level in the hierarchy develop more specific goals to
 support the more general ones above them in the hierarchy. To chart the agency's
 course of action and to ensure that it is moving toward its strategic goals, performance
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 plans are submitted on a yearly basis and contain short-term goals and performance
 indicators. Performance indicators, linked directly to goals, are to specify agency
 results in a way that is objective, measurable, and focused on outcomes rather than on
 inputs or outputs.
 Strategy articulation then follows this goal-setting and performance measurement
 process to explain how the goals are to be achieved. Strategies are to include descrip-
 tions of activities, resources, and programs that detail the day-to-day implementation
 process. As a further control over the agency's progress toward its strategic goals,
 yearly performance reports are submitted with the budget to the OMB and Congress.
 These reports are to review successful performance, identify unsuccessful performance,
 describe any remedial action that might be required, and recommend appropriate
 change to performance goals in subsequent fiscal years. Thus, the entire direction-
 setting process is executed as a comprehensive, top-down, conscious, formalized
 effort that is decomposed into specific steps and procedures with delineated checklists
 and supportive techniques to guide actions throughout the organization.
 LIMITATIONS AND USE OF THE SYNOPTIC MODEL
 The limitations of synoptic strategic planning have been well documented in the lit-
 erature (Hurst, 1986; Mintzberg, 1994). The approach is problematic, according to
 Mintzberg (1994), because it is founded on three fallacies: thefallacy ofpredetermina-
 tion (i.e., because the context for strategy making is stable or at least predictable, the
 process itself and its consequences or strategies can be predetermined), the fallacy of
 detachment (i.e., thought must be detached from action, strategy from operations, and
 thinking from doing), and the fallacy offormulation (i.e., the strategy-making process
 can be programmed by the use of systems) (pp. 221-321). These fallacies are particu-
 larly evident when organizations are in dynamic environments-ones that change fre-
 quently, if not constantly, in an unpredictable and uncontrollable way. Similarly, the
 fallacies are readily apparent in declining or emerging industries in which there is
 jockeying for position, periodic shakeouts, and wild and unpredictable shifts in market
 growth. The fallacies also surface in organizations where the absence of elaborated
 structures render planning difficult and where the operations of an organization are
 complex instead of simple, requiring skilled experts rather than operators to run them
 (pp. 402-404). Ultimately, the greatest fallacy is the assumption that one approach to
 strategic planning fits all. The "one best way" in which to strategically plan is limited
 because it is indiscriminantly applied to all forms of organization without considera-
 tion of their contexts.
 The synoptic approach to strategic planning does fit one organizational type and
 context: the machine bureaucracy. The machine bureaucracy has a dominant vertical
 hierarchy, sharp divisions of labor, standardization of work, insistence on controls and
 performance indicators, and reliance on staff specialists to plan and order its routines
 and standard operating procedures. As a highly structured organization with tightly
 coupled operations, its work is broken down into finely grained tasks so that they can
 be easily understood and simply executed without much expertise, as in the typical
 mass production assembly line. Its environment is stable, its industry is mature, and
 the organization works to keep them that way so as to minimize the threat of change
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 and uncertainty to its operating core. Its size tends to be large, favoring capital-
 intensive work and centralized control, with formal power resting at the strategic apex
 of the hierarchy. In this type of organization and in this context, strategic planning has
 had more success (Mintzberg, 1994). However, the planning process in this type of
 organization and context has been more accurately described as strategic program-
 ming rather than as strategic planning. Rather than relying on the strategic planning
 process to create strategies, the strategic planning process programs, elaborates, and
 formally operationalizes the strategies that already are identified (Mintzberg, 1994).
 Thus, although the machine bureaucracy has the advantage in programming what it
 already does well, it suffers when circumstances change and it is expected to invent
 new strategies to guide organizational action in the future.
 In summary, Bryson (1995) contends that the synoptic, or comprehensive, top-
 down goals approach to strategic planning tends to be employed successfully when an
 agency has a narrowly defined mission, there is a likelihood of broad and deep agree-
 ment on goals, there is enough goal specificity to guide strategy development, a hierar-
 chical authority structure exists in practice that empowers key decision makers to
 impose goals on those affected, there are externally imposed mandates to drive the
 direction-setting process, there are only a few powerful stakeholders, and participants
 in strategic planning are relatively homogeneous and share a consensus on values.
 Using Wilson's (1989) categorization, a synoptic goals approach is more appropriate
 for agencies that actually deliver services (e.g., production agencies), for those that
 have relatively stable histories so that there is time to complete a planning cycle, and
 for those that have experience with data collection and a belief in the accuracy of infor-
 mation. Finally, Radin (1997) would add that the synoptic approach is appropriate to
 the extent that there are manageable levels of conflict among stakeholders.
 GPRA and Implementation Challenges
 DATA FROM THE PILOTS
 Anticipating implementation difficulties, framers of the GPRA were prudent in
 calling for at least 10 pilots to provide a broad and diverse experience with the tenets of
 the law and to serve as the focal point of learning. The pilots were to be designated and
 orchestrated by the OMB and scheduled for fiscal years 1994 through 1996. A total of
 77 pilots, including 9 agency-level pilots (e.g., Defense Logistics Agency, Internal
 Revenue Service) and program-level pilots (e.g., Department of Veteran Affairs Loan
 Guaranty Program), eventually participated at some point during this time period.
 When the first set of pilots concluded at the end of fiscal year 1996, a total of 68 pilots
 representing 28 agencies still remained as participants (GAO, 1997a).
 Reports documenting pilot activity were disappointing but not surprising. Most ini-
 tial concerns centered around the identification of performance indicators and results.
 Agencies still were measuring activities (processes) and continued to struggle with
 devising outcome measures. For example, in 1994, the Occupational Safety and
 Health Administration (OSHA) was counting activities such as the numbers of safety
 and health standards promulgated, federal and state inspections conducted, criminal
 prosecutions referred, training grants supported, and consultation visits conducted
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 (GAO, 1997a). As another example, Housing and Urban Development's Public Hous-
 ing Management Assessment program was not collecting data on housing quality or
 the quality of maintenance, which, according to the GAO, is essential for assessing
 results and determining which housing authorities are performing well or poorly (p. 34).
 In fact, the OMB found that in about 20% of the performance plans it reviewed, the
 measures were not precise enough to be used in management and budgeting (GAO,
 1995). Nor have the problems in measuring results been resolved in the latest iteration.
 The General Services Administration's proposed fiscal 1999 performance plan, for
 example, continued to describe activities rather than results (GAO, 1998c). The
 GAO's survey of federal managers suggests that these problems will continue for some
 time. Federal managers reported that, overall, results-oriented performance informa-
 tion often was not available, and when it was available, it was not often used to make
 important agency and program decisions. Although 76% of federal managers govern-
 mentwide reported that their programs, projects, or operations had performance mea-
 sures, these measures were not results oriented (GAO, 1997a).
 There are a number of other technical and analytic challenges in measuring results
 that are documented in the GAO reports. Different parties are using different indica-
 tors to measure performance results across levels of government, such as in the case of
 child support enforcement, despite the fact that effectiveness depends on coordination
 among federal, state, and local jurisdictions (GAO, 1997a, p. 51). In other instances,
 key performance measures are computed differently in different agencies, making it
 difficult to compare the relative effectiveness of individual programs in "crosscutting
 programs." Reliance on outside parties (e.g., states) that administer federal programs
 makes it difficult to obtain accurate data. For example, the Department of Education
 faces difficulty in obtaining reliable data from adult education programs in the states
 due to double counting or undercounting of students in adult education programs.
 Thus, even when data are collected, their reliability and validity often are questionable
 (p. 50).
 Agency results also are influenced by external forces beyond their control such as
 broad national economic trends and assistance from state and local governments and
 the private sector. "Isolating the federal contribution to the achievement of an intended
 result has been exceedingly difficult and, accordingly, has hindered agency efforts to
 identify meaningful performance measures" (GAO, 1997a, p. 48). Regulatory agen-
 cies have had difficulty in sorting out the interaction that external factors have on their
 results and, accordingly, have had problems in identifying meaningful performance
 measures. For example, OSHA data often are influenced by catastrophic events, such
 as bombings and airplane crashes, over which OSHA has no control. In addition, some
 agencies need long time frames to achieve their results, and this makes annual perfor-
 mance measurement difficult. It might take years to see the results of the programs'
 activities. Latency periods between the exposure to a hazardous substance, such as
 asbestos, and a resulting illness could be 20 years. Research and development pro-
 grams have had similar difficulties in identifying the impacts of their research and have
 had to use a number of proxy measures, none of which is easily adaptable for the pur-
 poses of the GPRA (p. 50).
 Thus, as the GAO reports, the pilot phase "underscores how far organizations still
 have to progress in the development and use of results-oriented performance informa-
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 tion" (GAO, 1997a, p. 37). "The challenges confronting agencies as they seek to
 develop useful results-oriented performance information are substantial, [are] long-
 standing, and will not be quickly or easily resolved" (p. 56). Thus, it should not have
 been a surprise when, in November 1997, no agency (pilots included) won better than a
 C for its strategic plan and the vast majority of them received Fs (Laurent, 1998b). By
 April, House leaders had "flunked most agencies' performance plans" (Friel, 1998a),
 and by June 1998, House Republicans were announcing that plans were "not yet use-
 ful," saying, "Goals were vague and hard to measure, duplicative programs were not
 identified, and budget requests were not tied to goals" (Friel, 1998b).
 GPRA IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS LINKED
 TO STRATEGIC PLANNING MODEL
 Beyond the technical problems of defining and measuring results, far more serious
 issues have surfaced surrounding the GPRA. These issues center on the direction-
 setting process itself or how an agency comes to identify certain goals and results as
 desirable in the first place. The synoptic model of strategic planning embodied in the
 GPRA assumes that goal setting is not particularly problematic. In the worst case, the
 chief executive officer can identify goals he or she wishes to pursue and then, reliant on
 centralized power and control over resources, coerce the rest of the organization into
 compliance, removing or disciplining those who resist the directives.
 Direction setting in federal agencies, however, can be very problematic (Nutt &
 Backoff, 1992; Roberts, 1993). Agency executives do not have the same level of auton-
 omy and control to set direction in the shared power system of governance (Bryson &
 Einsweiler, 1991; Fisher, 1993). They serve many masters, in particular the president,
 who expects them to carry out his vision, and Congress, which expects them to link
 budgets to agency goals. To the extent that a consensus exists among the factions in
 Congress and the executive branch, agency direction setting can proceed without pro-
 tracted legislative debates and conflict. To the extent that a coalition has not yet
 emerged among the major players and a consensus has not yet been reached on what
 the agency should do or how it should accomplish what must be done, direction setting
 becomes a political process reliant on bargaining, negotiation, and politics. To para-
 phrase Rosenbloom (1995), we cannot assume that measurement will be a substitute
 for political choice in federal agencies.
 A recent example of how the politics can play out is illustrated in the Office of
 National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) reauthorization bill that contained six legisla-
 tively mandated agency performance goals. The bill requires the ONDCP to reduce
 teenage drug use by 90% and to halve the number of Americans using drugs by 2001.
 But the agency's strategic plan, supportive of President Clinton's program, reports that
 halving drug use will take 10 years. It is not clear how the differences between the
 House and the agency will be reconciled if the ONDCP sticks to its plan and reports
 progress but not the 50% reduction required by the House (Peters, 1998).
 The consequences of forcing the synoptic model of strategic planning on agencies
 when no consensus on agency goals exists or when the goals on which they do agree
 are so vague that they lack specificity to guide action are evident in the GAO reports
 and congressional criticisms of agencies' implementation efforts (Friel, 1998a, 1998b;
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 GAO, 1998a). Without well-articulated goals, executives have been unable to identify
 specific results. Without results, they have had little ability to evaluate agency perfor-
 mance based on outcomes and to judge how well their agencies are being managed and
 taxpayer money is being spent.
 The GPRA, prudently anticipating value differences in a shared power system of
 governance, does require consultations with key stakeholders, most notably those in
 Congress and those on the oversight committees, in the preparation of a strategic plan
 and a performance plan. However, there is no mention of what constitutes a consulta-
 tion, when it should occur, and with whom it should occur (GAO, 1997b). Most impor-
 tant, there is no mention of what happens when consultations fail to produce agree-
 ment on agency direction. It would appear that the current experimentation on strategic
 planning in the federal government rests on the ability to forge a consensus with no
 mention of what will happen if a consensus fails to emerge. As noted by the GAO, "The
 requirement for consultations is ... perhaps the [GPRA]'s most significant challenge
 because consultations will likely raise contentious policy issues that are inherent in the
 political process" (GAO, 1997a, p. 43). Acknowledging that direction setting requires
 making hard choices, "there may be disagreement between the agency and key stake-
 holders about particular goals or the means by which the goals will be achieved" (p. 44).
 Evidence of contention already exists, especially as agencies attempt to balance
 multiple priorities. For example, disagreements have surfaced within the Forest Ser-
 vice and among key external stakeholders, including those in Congress, on how it is to
 make choices among competing uses of its lands (e.g., conservation vs. logging vs.
 recreation). However, there has been little guidance on how to resolve conflict over
 competing uses such as promoting timber sales and promoting wildlife. According to
 the GAO, these conflicts "seriously undermined its ability to establish goals and per-
 formance measures needed to ensure its accountability" (GAO, 1997a, p. 42).
 Other instances have been noted. A congressional staff member reported that
 "major disagreements existed between the political parties as to the basic direction of
 an agency under his committee's jurisdiction" (GAO, 1997b, p. 6). "When subcom-
 mittee staff met with the agency's officials, the discussion quickly became quite con-
 frontational, and the session only served to reinforce tensions rather than resolve
 them" (p. 6). Other agencies have experienced difficulties in carving out their missions
 in the morass of competing requirements, statutory or otherwise (NAPA, 1998, p. 3).
 In addition, agencies have felt caught between conflicting demands, especially when
 the OMB and Congress differ on guidance to developing a strategic plan (p. 3).
 According to Hal Steinberg, issue coordinator of NAPA's Performance Consortium,
 "Many agencies are receiving mixed signals from Congress. Some appropriations sub-
 committees want to be involved, [and] others show no interest. Sometimes, agencies
 can feel as though they are getting 26 different reactions" (p. 4). These initial consulta-
 tions have led some to predict that agencies' current troubles with strategic and perfor-
 mance planning "may pale to insignificance when [the GPRA]'s political squabbles
 break out in earnest" (Laurent, 1998a, p. 24).
 Initial difficulties over consultations perhaps explain why federal managers with
 GPRA experience report greater difficulties in reconciling competing views. For
 example,
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 58[1%] of managers in selected [GPRA] pilots reported that reconciling differing congres-
 sional views has been or will be somewhat difficult to very difficult, compared to 46[%]
 of managers in all other federal agencies. Similarly, 59[%] of managers in selected
 [GPRA] pilots reported that reconciling the views of other parties has been or will be
 somewhat difficult to very difficult, compared to 48[%] of federal managers in all other
 agencies. (GAO, 1997a, p. 42)
 These differences are statistically significant.
 The potential for conflict might, in fact, account for the few consultations that have
 occurred up to this point. Most committee staff and agency officials, particularly com-
 mittee staff, have stressed the very limited nature of the meetings, characterizing them
 as briefings, pre-consultations, or preliminary consultations. By the spring of 1997,
 fewer than half of the largest agencies had contacted congressional committees about
 their strategic plans, and those that did occur were disappointing, according to Repub-
 lican staff task forces. There have been differing views on the level of detail during the
 consultations. It was the general impression of some agency officials that the consulta-
 tions were to concern only agency missions and strategic goals. Most committee staff,
 on the other hand, believed that agencies also should be prepared to provide informa-
 tion on programmatic issues and measures (GAO, 1997b, p. 10).
 Consultations also have suffered from a number of other factors. First, developing
 and sustaining top-level agency commitment has been problematic. There is a high
 turnover rate among political appointees; the medium tenure in large agencies is about
 2 years, and some positions are vacant longer than they are filled (GAO, 1995). Com-
 mitted and effective leadership required to implement the GPRA has been missing in
 many cases. Although a GAO survey found that about 57% of managers said that their
 agency leadership demonstrated a strong commitment to achieving results to a great
 extent or to a very great extent, only about 16% said that managers above their levels
 made program changes based on results-oriented performance information to a great
 extent or to a very great extent. So, although the commitment to results might be there,
 its practice has been lacking (GAO, 1997a).
 Rewards, a significant element for any successful change, have been missing as
 well. Less than half of federal managers reported positive recognition for achieving
 results (GAO, 1997a, p. 63). Training personnel is another issue. The Office of Person-
 nel Management estimated in 1993 that there were more than 300,000 managers in the
 federal system who would need to be trained in the GPRA. Yet, agencies have not
 developed or implemented an agencywide training strategy that identifies who needs
 to be trained as well as on what, how, and when. To compound the problem, increases
 in training budgets are not likely during this period of retrenchment (GAO, 1995).
 Overlapping and fragmented program efforts also have made developing a consen-
 sus on goals difficult. In response to national needs and problems, Congress and the
 executive branch have given responsibility for addressing national issues to many dif-
 ferent agencies. For example,
 Of the 18 national mission areas displayed in the federal budget, 14 were addressed by
 more than 1 executive branch department or major agency in fiscal year 1996 such as
 health, international affairs, and justice. Six of the national missions, including
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 education, income security, and commerce and housing credit, were addressed by 6 or
 more executive branch departments and major agencies. (GAO, 1997a, pp. 38-39)
 Many agencies' programs also run into difficulties because their crosscutting pro-
 grams require coordination across the federal level and implementation at state and
 local levels, yet hierarchical authority structures do not exist to impose goals on the
 entire system. The Office of Child Support Enforcement is one example. It relies on
 cooperation among state and local agencies for enforcement, but it has found gaining a
 consensus on goals among all entities involved and agreement on performance mea-
 sures to be very difficult (GAO, 1997a).
 The crosscutting problem becomes even more acute when examined at the program
 level. In the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, for example, there are 342 eco-
 nomic development-related programs administered by 13 agencies. It is difficult to
 coordinate so many programs, each with its own individual funding streams, application
 requirements, and reporting expectations. In addition, attempts to reduce or eliminate
 overlapping and redundant mission assignments can threaten to disrupt traditional
 subcommittee arrangements, raise conflicts over agency roles and programs, and geo-
 graphically redistribute federal funds (GAO, 1997d). Employment training, for
 example, is reviewed and funded by seven different appropriations subcommittees.
 However, readjustments in committee jurisdictions open up the potential for "ugly
 internecine warfare over the missions and need for many programs" (Laurent, 1998a,
 p. 24). It should not be surprising, then, that reviews of agencies' strategic plans have
 found little sign of significant coordination among agencies (GAO, 1998b) despite the
 fact that these crosscutting mission assignments at all levels of government need "to
 ensure that goals are consistent and, as appropriate, that programs are mutually rein-
 forcing" (GAO, 1997a, p. 1).
 The challenge of balancing multiple priorities within individual agencies and coor-
 dinating the crosscutting issues among them have prompted the GAO (1997a) to
 conclude,
 Although the [GPRA] provides a potentially effective vehicle for addressing these issues,
 their existence also makes the prospects for effective govemmentwide implementation of
 the act uncertain in the near term. Efforts under the [GPRA] can help identify the extent
 and consequences of the overlap and fragmentation, but addressing such problems will
 likely be a lengthy process because Congress and the executive branch will have to con-
 sider policy trade-offs to reach a reasonable degree of consensus on the appropriate fed-
 eral response to national needs. Similarly, balancing multiple priorities will need to be an
 ongoing process because priorities change as new needs arise. (p. 45)
 Unfortunately, making trade-offs is not what politicians are prone to do, nor are they
 particularly interested in making them. As Donald Savoie emphasizes, government's
 "objectives are unclear because politicians prefer it that way" (quoted in Behn, 1996,
 p. 18). "Clarifying objectives is managerially sound but politically irrational," com-
 ments Behn (p. 18). Clarification requires politicians to choose from among compet-
 ing constituencies and values. "From experience, elected officials have learned that
 they can win more praise, support, and votes by being fuzzy about what results it [sic]
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 will produce by when than by being clear" (p. 18). Discussions about specific targets
 for specific programs, specific agencies, and specific years is problematic. It
 reintroduces political disagreements that have been carefully minimized by incorporat-
 ing the vague (rather than precise) purposes into the authorizing legislation. A legislative
 preamble that outlines general, multiple, and perhaps even contradictory purposes can
 make a lot of people happy. The purposes set forth in legislation are not multiple and gen-
 eral because no legislator had a clear idea of what goal he or she wanted to achieve; rather,
 the preamble contains multiple general purposes because, although many legislators
 could identify one or more specific goals to be achieved, they could not agree on a few
 common ones. (p. 18)
 This point was reflected in the comments of one OMB official who noted, "A strategic
 plan that achieved complete agreement among all interested parties was likely to be at
 such a high level of generality that its usefulness as a decision-making tool would be
 fairly limited" (GAO, 1997a, p. 44).
 Alternatives to Synoptic Model of Strategic Planning
 The vision approach to strategic planning is one alternative to synoptic strategic
 planning. It calls for top-level executives to give stakeholders very general and broad
 guidance on the agency's future. Agency experts throughout the organization then are
 expected to find the best ways in which to achieve the vision. Reliant on grassroots
 innovation and entrepreneurship, this approach acknowledges that strategies can
 emerge from anywhere in the organization, not just top-down dictates (Behn, 1988;
 Mintzberg, 1994). The vision approach has been found to be useful when a relatively
 short idealized scenario of the future can be developed, there is a good probability that
 key actors can agree on a vision, a holistic or integrated direction is necessary, a new
 executive takes office (especially during a crisis), the social unit or units are not tightly
 constrained by mandates and conflicting expectations among numerous stakeholders,
 and a homogeneous group of people share an underlying value consensus (Bryson,
 1995). Research and development organizations, such as NASA, have used the vision
 approach very successfully (Levine, 1982).
 The strategic issues approach to strategic planning, a second alternative to the syn-
 optic approach, also has been successfully used and widely adopted in many govern-
 ment agencies and communities (Bryson, 1995; Nutt & Backoff, 1992). Relaxing the
 requirements of the synoptic approach, the strategic issues planning and management
 model does not expect that a comprehensive integrated set of goals and subgoals can or
 will be identified, at least in the short term. Instead, the model encourages executives to
 obtain a limited agreement on some strategic issues or questions that the agency can do
 something about immediately. The strategic issue question then prompts the search for
 strategies and performance indicators to track the chosen strategy's progress. Rather
 than wait for comprehensive agreement and integration on overall agency goals, the
 only consensus required to begin a strategic planning effort is to decide what limited
 set of questions will be addressed (Roberts, 1997). Executives then develop a specific
 set of action plans and performance measures that deal with each strategic issue.
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 By narrowing its focus and requirements, the strategic issues planning model takes
 the middle ground between the political and rational models of decision making. The
 political model, often characterized as "muddling through," produces disjointed
 bureau policies and strategies, the consequence of partisan mutual adjustment among
 competing interests (Lindblom, 1959). On the other hand, the rational model of deci-
 sion making, which requires comprehensive integrated goals and plans to link all parts
 of the organization, sets the "bar" very high for organizations operating in a political
 context because it requires a level of agreement that is difficult to achieve in all situa-
 tions. Attempting to incorporate aspects of both models, the strategic issues model
 attends to the political context and stakeholder requirements while at the same time
 planning and integrating organizational activity around a subset of issues on which
 there is consensus. Thus, according to Bryson (1995), the strategic issues approach, in
 contrast to the synoptic (goals) and vision approach to strategic planning, is suited for
 government agencies when there is no agreement on goals or the goals are too abstract
 to be useful; there is no vision of success and developing a consensus-based vision will
 be difficult; there is no hierarchy that can impose goals on the stakeholders; the envi-
 ronment is very turbulent and goal setting is problematic; the domain is partisan, poli-
 ticized, and fragmented, and taking partial action to address key questions and issues is
 preferable to taking no action at all.
 More specifically, the strategic issues approach to planning is likely to work in
 agencies that deliver dollars and some regulations (e.g., block grant programs) but do
 not have real control over the way in which the federal dollars are designated (GAO,
 1997c), those that experience dramatic swings in program designs, those that do not
 have agreement on data categories or indeed on the legitimacy of the federal govern-
 ment requests for information, and those that operate in highly politicized external
 environments with explicit conflict among various stakeholders (Radin, 1997). Thus,
 from all available sources to date, strategic issues planning has been found to be the
 approach of choice when direction setting is most problematic.
 The strategic issues planning model also is useful when executives need to address
 the tensions and paradoxes that threaten to pull stakeholders in many different direc-
 tions at the same time (Nutt & Backoff, 1992, pp. 127-145). Geared to assist partici-
 pants in managing a world of competing values and priorities, it puts the paradoxical
 issues upfront and center rather leaving them unaddressed. The intention is to help
 managers confront the reality of their circumstances and, in so doing, develop strate-
 gies that are a better fit with their context. One could envision a strategic issues plan-
 ning session with federal agencies beginning with the following as yet unexplored
 paradoxical questions that are at the heart of the dilemma of introducing strategic plan-
 ning to the federal government. How can we exert the requisite control to strategically
 plan our organizations in a shared power system of governance that has been estab-
 lished to check our control and power? How can we be held accountable through a
 strict chain of command, from elected representatives to organizational executives and
 managers, and yet adapt to a changing environment that necessitates individual and
 agency flexibility, experimentation, and innovation as well as freedom from that chain
 of command? How can we be responsive to the unique needs of our citizen-customer
 yet guarantee that all other citizens are treated equitably? How can we ensure that gov-
 ernment works better, which often requires adaptation and increased expenditures, yet
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 at the same time ensure that government costs less, which demands efficiency, cost-
 cutting, and downsizing?
 Besides offering a better fit with the tensions in a politicized context, strategic
 issues planning has other advantages. It can draw together numerous stakeholders in
 extended networks, and it can accommodate large groups of people. These are particu-
 larly important features for crosscutting programs and issues that require collabora-
 tion across agencies and levels of government. No longer limited by organizational
 boundaries, strategic issues planning can attract and accommodate thousands (Rob-
 erts, 1997), especially when combined with the techniques known as "large group
 interventions" (Bunker & Alban, 1997). Agency flexibility also is enhanced given that
 executives can respond to issue cycles rather than to artificially created planning
 cycles. Synoptic planning cycles might lock them into action that is a poor fit with
 changing circumstances, especially when dramatic shifts are occurring in the political
 or economic context. When that misfit occurs, strategic plans become outdated paper
 exercises with little bearing on reality (Mintzberg, 1994).
 Conclusion
 The GPRA is an important marker in the history of administrative reform. Note-
 worthy is its emphasis on agency results and its insistence that executives manage to
 those results. Despite the progress being made in implementing the law, however, I
 have argued in this article that the GPRA is constrained by the limited conceptualiza-
 tion of strategic planning that is embedded in it. The synoptic model of strategic plan-
 ning that the GPRA champions is a poor fit for many bureaus to the extent that they
 confront value and stakeholder conflicts, manage crosscutting programs, and experi-
 ence a high degree of change and instability in their task and general environments. I
 share the views of those who have raised doubts about one-size-fits-all models and find
 their objections compelling. We would do well to remember that "public management
 cannot be divorced from politics and the political culture. Rarely is poor management
 in the public sector the outcome of purely managerial reasons and a bureaucratic cul-
 ture" (Caiden, 1994, p. 126).
 To the extent that a consensus on any agency's direction emerges, synoptic strategic
 planning and the changes it prompts hold promise for reform (Khademian, 1995;
 Simon, 1997). As in business, when there is a consensus and a dominant coalition
 strong enough to enforce it, synoptic strategic planning can be useful to program the
 consensus that already exists. To the extent that a dissensus occurs-over agency
 direction or over implementation-and cannot be resolved, synoptic strategic plan-
 ning will have less utility. Strategic issues planning can offer an alternative to top-
 down, comprehensive integrated planning, but its use depends on the acknowledgment
 that there are important differences among federal agencies and that these differences
 make a difference in how strategy is planned, implemented, and evaluated.
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